

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

* * *

JOSEPH PRICE,

Case No. 3:24-cv-00515-MMD-CSD

v.

Plaintiff,

ORDER

NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, *et al.*,

Defendants.

I. SUMMARY

Plaintiff Joseph Price brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections. (ECF No. 5.) On May 12, 2025, this Court ordered Price to file an amended complaint by June 11, 2025. (ECF No. 4.) The Court warned Price that the action could be dismissed if he failed to file an amended complaint by that deadline. (*Id.* at 6.) That deadline expired and Price did not file an amended complaint, move for an extension, or otherwise respond.

II. DISCUSSION

District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See *Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring *pro se* plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v. U.S. Postal Service*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to

1 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public's
2 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court's need to manage its docket;
3 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of
4 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See *In re
5 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
6 *Malone*, 833 F.2d at 130).

7 The first two factors, the public's interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation
8 and the Court's interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Price's
9 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal
10 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing
11 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See *Anderson v. Air West*, 542
12 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of
13 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal.

14 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can
15 be used to correct the party's failure that brought about the Court's need to consider
16 dismissal. See *Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining
17 that considering less drastic alternatives *before* the party has disobeyed a court order
18 does not satisfy this factor); *accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th
19 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that
20 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s
21 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled
22 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by *Yourish*).
23 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a
24 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779
25 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed until and
26 unless Price files an amended complaint, the only alternative is to enter a second order
27 setting another deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only
28 delays the inevitable and squanders the Court's finite resources. The circumstances here

1 do not indicate that this case will be an exception: there is no hint that Price needs
2 additional time or evidence that he did not receive the Court's screening order. Setting
3 another deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth
4 factor favors dismissal.

5 Having thoroughly considered the dismissal factors, the Court finds that they weigh
6 in favor of dismissal.

7 **III. CONCLUSION**

8 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on
9 Price's failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court's May 12, 2025,
10 order (ECF No. 4).

11 The Clerk of Court is further directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this
12 case. No other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. If Price wishes to pursue
13 his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case.

14 It is further ordered that Price's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* (ECF No.
15 1) is denied as moot.

16 DATED THIS 27th Day of June 2025.



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18 MIRANDA M. DU
19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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